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Constructing the New Nepal: Religious Billboards in 
Nepal’s Second People’s Movement
Accompanying King Gyanendra’s February First, 
2005, efforts to consolidate his loosening grip 
on national power, the royal Nepali government 
raised a series of highly visible billboards 
throughout the cities of the Kathmandu Valley. 
A small subset of these boards were explicitly 
religious, encouraging Nepal’s citizens to 
perform their patriotic bhakti (devotion), karma 
(action), and dharma (duty). This rhetorical 
support of a ‘universal’ Hinduism contradicted 
the inclusivism that was widely regarded as 
part and parcel of the ‘new Nepal’ and resulted 
in a contradictory vision of the same: a modern 
secular nation composed of citizens, rather 
than of subservient subjects, unified by and 
working together with a Hindu monarch for the 
betterment of the nation. 
This conflict contributed to the widespread 
skepticism with which these signs were met, 
indicated by the multiple acts of graffiti, 
vandalism, and outright destruction brought 
against them, and by their removal by the 
royal government fifteen months later. This 
paper will detail the form and content of these 
religious billboards and argue that this religious 
language was one of the reasons behind their 
failure to deliver a message amenable to the 
middle class citizens of Kathmandu, as diverse 
parties throughout contemporary Nepal 
worked to define the multivalent ‘new Nepal.’
Keywords: Nepal, politics, religion, media, royalty.
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Introduction
“It is our faith that we will all join together for the 
construction of a strong and successful new Nepal 
that is firmly committed to constitutional monar-
chy and multiparty democracy.” 
saṁvaidhānik rājtantra ra bahudalīya prajātantra 
jagmā adiera sabal ra samunnata nava nepāl nirmāṇ 
mā hāmī sabai juṭnu pardcha bhanne hāmro viśvās 
cha
– Billboard on Kathmandu’s Kanthipath Road, at-
tributed to Śrī 5 Gyānendra
The multivalent term ‘new Nepal’ (N. nayā Nepāl) used in 
the billboard quoted above has become the watchword 
of parties in many quarters of Nepali society to name the 
social, developmental, and political processes currently 
at work in post-monarchical Nepal.1 Due to the official 
processes of bringing to an end the Nepali monarchy in 
2006-2008 and the absence of a constitution since 2006, 
many citizens anticipate this desired ‘new Nepal’ while 
transitioning from an implied ‘old Nepal,’ a nation that was 
ruled by an active monarchy and racked by a decade-long 
civil war with Maoist rebels. The issues at stake in the new 
Nepal are generally those that had been rejected in the for-
ty-point demand that the Maoist party had attempted to 
negotiate in 1996: nationality, democracy, and livelihood 
(Hutt 2004: 5, 285-287). Similarly, scholarship on the new 
Nepal, in positing and predicting the nation’s trajectory, 
builds off of these same concerns, taking up such addition-
al issues as freedom of the press (Hutt 2006), the political 
power of indigenous groups (Hangen 2007), the role of 
informal institutions in the political exclusion of margin-
alized groups (Lawoti 2008), the sociology of the conflict 
itself (Lawoti and Pahari 2010), and the 1990 Constitution 
that reinforced the institutional problems to which Maoist 
rebels and social and ethnic activists responded (Malagodi 
2013).
Much of this scholarship specifically utilizes the term ‘new 
Nepal’ as it accounts for, projects, and occasionally pre-
scribes the characteristics of the democratizing nation and 
largely focuses on the concept of inclusion (N. samābeśi) 
that counters the “monolithic” Nepal whose constitution 
“had been blamed for institutionalizing, legitimizing, and 
engendering patterns of exclusion and discrimination” 
(Malagodi 2013: 3).2 In his 2010 book New Nepal: The Fault 
Lines, strategic analyst Nishchal Pandey describes the 
new Nepal as an “inclusive and democratic” nation that 
includes “the concept of federalism based on ethnicity” 
(Pandey 2010: 38, 44). The new Nepal, Pandey writes, 
represents a “‘positive transformation’ of the state from 
a centralized, unitary, feudal rule of only a certain privi-
leged section of the society to an inclusive, federal and a 
truly democratic republic…” (Pandey 2010: 2). Similarly, 
journalist Rita Manchanda emphasizes the shift in nation-
al conflict from one between monarchy and democratic 
forces to one dealing with ethnic and regional issues where 
inclusion becomes key (Manchanda 2006: 5035; Manchanda 
2008; Snellinger 2009). In separate articles on the educa-
tion and performance of Maoist rebels and organizations, 
Kristine Eck (2010: 44) and Amanda Snellinger (2010: 80) 
see a welcoming of traditionally excluded groups and 
individuals as one of the primary features of the new Nepal 
desired by opponents of the Nepali monarchy. Despite the 
high degree of consistency among these applications of the 
term, Mahendra Lawoti and Anup Pahari warn that it func-
tions as little more than a metaphor that entails “no more 
than a skeletal consensus on what a ‘New Nepal’ means in 
practical terms, or how to get there” (Lawoti and Pahari 
2010: 319). The new Nepal, then, represents the process of 
constructing a nation along more openly democratic lines 
more than it represents any single static moment in time.
Before its dissolution, Nepal’s royal government communi-
cated its own vision of the new Nepal through its instal-
lation of 149 billboards displayed throughout the cities of 
the Kathmandu Valley. The Department of Information 
installed these boards immediately following the State of 
Emergency that King Gyanendra declared on 1 February 
2005; citing the 1990 Constitution, Gyanendra assumed 
absolute power of the country and suspended freedoms of 
speech and assembly in a bid to end the decade-long civil 
war with the Maoist rebels and to bring together the seven 
main democratic parties. These billboards thus constituted 
one piece in Gyanendra’s attempt to consolidate state pow-
er in the palace by communicating his vision of the new 
Nepal, a vision outlined in his February First proclamation 
that provided the original source for many of the messages 
inscribed on these boards (Government of Nepal 2005). 
Though the messages outlined on these boards touched on 
the most pressing and publicly discussed issues of the day, 
namely those contained in the Maoists’ forty-point de-
mand, a small number contained explicitly Hindu religious 
language: bhakti, karma, and dharma (devotion, action, and 
duty). The Hindu rhetoric contained in these boards does 
not represent the religion actually practiced throughout 
Nepal, but rather prescribes a suitable religio-political ide-
ology for Kathmandu’s developing middle class at a time 
of crisis for the Nepali monarchy. In analyzing the installa-
tion, socio-political role, and materiality of these royal bill-
boards, I am considering them as a part of the Nepali ijjat 
economy. Mark Liechty describes this as a moral-material 
26 |  HIMALAYA Spring 2015
economy whose “regimen of orthodox practices … marks 
out a new middle space between tradition and modernity” 
(Liechty 2003: 84). Dealing more specifically with religion, I 
also have in mind the “middle class religiosity” that Robert 
Orsi refers to in his work on Catholic practices in major 
American cities, with its “[s]anitized, carefully bounded 
and contained notions of spirituality, religion, or faith…” 
(Orsi 1985: xviii).3
The sanitized language of bhakti, karma, and dharma in 
Gyanendra’s billboards conflated religious performance 
with political practice. Incorporating a generalized form of 
a universal Nepali Hinduism, it suggested the “regimen of 
orthodox practices” required for the residents of a modern 
nation-state. The “sanitized” Hinduism promoted in these 
boards targeted the urban middle class citizens of Kath-
mandu, an educated and upwardly mobile demographic 
concerned with “the material and ‘realist’ logics” (Liechty 
2003: 182) that comprise the socio-economics (free-market 
economy), politics (multiparty representative democracy), 
and identity (neoliberal self) widely envisioned in the new 
Nepal (Kunreuther 2010). Though not necessarily reflec-
tive of diverse local realities, specifically those outside 
Kathmandu, this language possessed the potential to fill 
the relative void left by the weakening of specifically 
Hindu religious elements formerly associated with Nepal’s 
constitution and monarchy. These elements include the 
ban on cow slaughter and on proselytizing; the promotion 
of Hindu religious festivals, religious discourses, caste 
hierarchy, and Sanskrit education; and the Hindu monar-
chy itself (Sharma 2002: 22). As these billboards prescribed, 
Nepali people, now citizens of equal standing in a modern 
nation-state rather than subservient and stratified subjects 
of a medieval monarchy, might fulfill their quasi-religious 
duty through their support of human rights, of the Nepali 
state and its security forces, and of the nation’s moderniza-
tion and development. 
Rather than focusing on the bottom-up rhetorical and per-
formative tactics that form the core of studies on Maoist 
rebels, political parties, and informal institutions in con-
temporary Nepal, this essay contributes to ongoing con-
versations about political power, language, and media by 
exploring the royal Nepali government’s attempt to deploy 
this type of religiosity from the top down. Seira Tamang’s 
critique of “the imposition of explanatory categories from 
above” applies well here, as these billboards reproduce the 
“disempowering manner in which ostensibly ‘democratiz-
ing’ principles or objectives are actually wielded in Nepal” 
(Tamang 2002: 315-316). Thus, despite references to devel-
opment and modernity, the religious language contained 
in Gyanendra’s billboards continued to support the exclu-
sion that had been enshrined in the ‘old Nepal,’ especially 
in King Mahendra’s 1962 Panchayat Constitution, which 
established Nepal as a ‘Hindu kingdom.’ This continuity 
with Nepal’s past contributed to the ultimate rejection of 
these boards fifteen months later amidst the April 2006 jan 
andolan, the nationwide movement during which tens of 
thousands of Nepalis protested the king’s autocratic grasp 
at power. Widely vandalized by the Nepali public, these 
boards, ultimately removed by the Nepali government, 
signaled the rejection of Gyanendra’s vision of the nation 
described within these boards. 
This essay will be divided into three sections, each of 
which will contain an epigraph that, bearing the content 
of one of the billboards, will introduce the content of 
that section. The first section will introduce the form and 
content of the billboards, the socio-political context of 
the new Nepal in which they were raised, and the middle 
class audience to which they were directed; the second 
section will detail the content of the religious billboards; 
and the concluding section will address the role of religion 
in the ‘new Nepal’ and will reflect on th e rejection of the 
billboards within the larger setting of the iconoclasm seen 
through-out the second jan andolan. 
Modern, Middle Class Billboards
“Fruitful democracy is the true ‘people’s doctrine.’” 
saphal prajātantra nai
sakkalī janavād ho   
– Billboard on Kathmandu’s Kantipath Road, at-
tributed to Śrī 5 Gyānendra
In his work on middle class modernity in Kathmandu, 
Mark Liechty establishes the middle class of Nepal’s largest 
city and capital as not significantly different from middle 
class populations anywhere in the developed or developing 
world. Like the new Nepal itself, middle classness is not a 
status to be attained once and for all, but a fluid social pro-
cess; relative to the “large population of urban poor” below 
and the “small transnational elite” above, the middle class 
is “a constantly renegotiated cultural space . . . in which 
the terms of inclusion and exclusion are endlessly tested, 
negotiated, and affirmed” (Liechty 2003: 4, 16). Members 
of the aspiring middle class perform this negotiation of in-
clusion and exclusion through a variety of related means: 
their consumption rather than production of commodities; 
their rhetorical emphasis on honor, personal achievement, 
and responsibility that transcends traditional vocabularies; 
and their use of “local caste logics and other religiously 
based notions of propriety and suitability that, in turn, 
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shape middleclass discourses of honor and prestige” 
(Liechty 2003: 14, 20). All of these practices and many more 
work to ground such values as “the material and ‘realist’ 
logics of consumerism, labor, democracy, freedom, individ-
ual achievement, and responsibility” (Liechty 2003: 182). 
The form and content of these royal billboards supported 
this middle-class modernity by consistently referencing 
these negotiated characteristics and of the active role that 
their audience was to take in the construction of new Ne-
pal. Each sign contained a message in formal Sanskritized 
Nepali, around which was placed a set of emblems and 
phrases identifying its royal source.4 The lower left-hand 
corner of each board was marked with the name of the 
governmental agency responsible for its publication, Śrī 5 
ko Sarkār Sūcnā Vibhāg (the Royal Government’s Depart-
ment of Information). On either the far left or far right of 
each sign was an oval containing an emblem of either the 
royal crown or the flag of Nepal. Finally, the lower-right 
hand corner contained the name of the royal figure to 
whom the message was attributed; in most cases this is 
either Śrī 5 Gyānendra or Sva. Śrī 5 Bīrendra.5 Immediately 
following Gyanedra’s 2006 reinstatement of Parliament, 
these phrases acknowledging royal authorship were rou-
tinely covered over or erased, the public’s most consistent 
method of defacing the billboards (Ranjitkar 2009). 
Gyanendra was not the first to use the medium of the 
billboard for the dissemination of political information. 
The same form was used by Gyanendra’s father, King 
Mahendra, in the relatively media-free society of late 
nineteen sixties Nepal, to communicate “propaganda and 
publicity emphasizing the traditional role of the monarch 
as a symbol of national unity and as a centre of loyalty for 
various ethnic groups” (Shah 1990: 7).6 Though the content 
of Mahendra’s messages has not, to my knowledge, been 
preserved in any systematic way, several fragments do 
exist. Fran Hosken provides one example in her 1974 pho-
tographic survey of changing life in the Kathmandu Valley: 
a family-planning poster from the city of Patan that shows 
a family of four (mother, father, son, and daughter) with 
the slogan “Sano parivar, sukhi parivar” (“A small family is 
a happy family”) (Hosken 1974: 285). The main characters 
in Samrat Upadhyay’s 2006 novel The Royal Ghosts reflect 
on the rather insipid content of this first generation of 
royal billboard. When Rumila advises Suresh to “focus on 
the present and the future” rather than on the past, Suresh 
jokes that “she sounded like the so-called Supreme Pro-
nouncements of the kings that were scrawled on billboards 
across the city: ‘Use your hands, not your mouth, to build 
your country.’ ‘Our Nation, Culture, King—dearer than 
our own life.’” Rumila responds that her favorite billboard 
was “the one in English that exhorted drivers to be Better 
Late Than Never—and this in a country where most people 
barely knew English” (Upadhyay 2006: 83-84). The use of 
such messages in Upadhyay’s novel reflects upon the rela-
tive absence of non-sanctioned forms of public communi-
Figure 1. “Fruitful democracy is the 
true ‘people’s doctrine.’”
(Michael Baltutis, 2006)
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cation in Mahendra’s Panchayat-era Nepal, as well as the 
mild amusement with which his billboards were received 
(Baltutis 2011: 194). Gyanendra’s billboards not only hear-
kened back to the time of his father when the few media 
outlets in landlocked Nepal were legally prohibited from 
challenging the king and his government, but they also 
visually reinforced his own 2005 ban on all international 
communication, leaving these boards—at least in theo-
ry—as the only messages in town (Onta 2006: 1, 123). Thus, 
despite their promise of the “beginning of a new era,” as 
one billboard proclaimed, Gyanendra’s messages, in both 
their form and content, maintained a striking continuity 
with Nepal’s past (Bhattarai 2007).
The content of the 149 billboards can roughly be grouped 
into seven themes, all of which dovetail with the charac-
teristics described by Liechty above. Multiple boards refer 
to human rights, opposition to terrorism, civic responsibil-
ity, royal responsibility, development and modernization 
(Nep. bikās), integration into a larger world, and multiparty 
democracy (Baltutis 2011: 196-7). The board quoted in the 
epigraph to this section and depicted in Figure 1 deals 
with the broader issue of inclusion that grounds middle 
class aspirations. The message on this board, “Fruitful 
democracy is the true ‘people’s doctrine,’” substitutes a 
much more common term for “democracy,” prajātantra, 
for janavād, which I have translated here more literally as 
the ‘people’s doctrine.’7 This message obliquely refers to 
the major political issue of the day, the ongoing conflict 
with Maoist rebels, by playing both on the Maoist des-
ignation of the “People’s War” (janayuddh), the civil war 
begun in 1996, and on the name of the socialist philosophy 
of Maoism itself (māovād). Using a word that juxtaposes 
the key elements of these two terms (jana- and -vād), the 
royal government stated its preferences for the future 
direction of the country by asserting that responsible 
citizens of Kathmandu, rather than the Maoists who had 
been grabbing many of the headlines, had a significant and 
even the “true” (sakkalī) role to play in the future direction 
of the country.8 This theme of the opposition between the 
respectable citizens of Kathmandu and the Maoist rebels 
permeates the entire set of billboards. I believe this is pur-
poseful and intended to collapse any distinction between 
citizen, student leader, and democratic party member, 
thus making all non-Maoists ‘suitable’ to assist in the 
construction of the new Nepal.9 Furthermore, the boards 
place this opposition in transhistorical rhetoric lauding 
the proper attitudes and responsibilities of the citizens of a 
“Hindu and Constitutional Monarchical Kingdom,” whose 
sovereignty is constitutionally “vested in the Nepalese 
people” (Article 1.3).
Though equal in size and prominence to advertising bill-
boards, these political billboards remained in situ for over 
a year, rather than undergoing the typical rotation of “gi-
gantic effigies of consumption every two to three months” 
(Note 2007: 138). The general dissatisfaction that resulted 
in the removal of these signs is rooted, in part, in the 
uncomfortable relationship they had to the commercial 
signs with which they vied for public attention. On the one 
hand, Gyanendra’s billboards possessed an eerie stability 
in an economic milieu that requires the constant rotation 
of new commercial goods and the means by which they 
are advertised to consumers, while on the other hand they 
projected a particular vision of the future all too similar 
to that advertised on billboards for beauty products, beer, 
motorcycles, etc. In line with middle class desires for ma-
terial wealth and status, it was the job of these billboards, 
overlooking some of the busiest roads in the country, to 
reform Nepal’s citizens and imbue them with a version of 
modernity more amenable to a twenty-first century Nepal, 
though one that would anachronistically retain the king 
as the nation’s leader (Baltutis 2011: 195). As I will argue 
below, the religious billboards in particular performed this 
same work as they translated the duties of Nepali citizens 
from political to religious language.
Religious Billboards
“All those who love the motherland should commit 
as one to making patriotism (deśbhakti) our meeting 
point.”
mātṛbhūmilāī māyā garne
sabaile deśbhaktiko milanbindumā
aikyabaddha hune praṇ garauṁ
– Billboard on Kathmandu’s Kantipath Road, at-
tributed to Śrī 5 Gyānendra
The religious language on Gyanendra’s state-sponsored 
billboards avoided reference to any specific religious ac-
tions (e.g., the performance of a particular ritual). Rather, 
references to concepts such as bhakti, karma, and dharma 
remained general but recognizable as religious and support-
ed the royal vision of a new Nepal that would be unified 
by its acceptance of what Orsi refers to as the “sanitized, 
carefully bounded and contained” vocabulary of a “middle 
class religiosity” that would transcend sectarianism and 
promote inclusion (Orsi 1985: xviii) . Thus, rather than 
constituting a “state-sponsored Hinduism,” as Basu frames 
the sometimes intimate relationship between Hinduism 
and royal politics in Nepal (2010: 111), these billboards 
promoted the socio-economic and political processes seen 
to be required for the building of the new Nepal. In these 
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processes, citizens are to actively exercise civic respon-
sibility through their collective support of a democratic 
monarchy. Thus, one board quoting King Birendra read: 
“The Nepali crown is for the people, the Nepali people are 
for the crown, and the king and people are together for 
Nepal and for [all things] Nepali.”10
Several recent studies have dealt with South Asian exam-
ples of this religious mode, wherein members of a mobile 
middle class, those tenuously hanging “between the high 
and the low” (Liechty 2003: 61), negotiate their own terms 
of inclusion and exclusion through religious media. Exam-
ples of this include the construction of goddess temples 
in contemporary Chennai, the publication of comic books 
and their consumption in the Hindu diaspora, and the 
commodification of Hindu pūjā (worship) items in Singa-
pore (Waghorne 2001; McLain 2009; Sinha 2011). Philip 
Lutgendorf provides another such example in his inter-
pretation of the rise of the iconography of and devotion 
to the powerful pañcha-mukhī (five-faced) Hanumān; this 
“tantrified” deity is a means whereby, “In a Kali Yuga of 
spiraling consumerism, corruption, and inflation, mid-
dle-class worshipers … desire the ‘quick fix’ of Tantra but 
within the context of the respectable Vaishnava piety long 
advocated by prosperous mercantile groups” (Lutgendorf 
2001: 288). Associated with both Śiva and Vishnu, Ha-
numān possesses a “reverence for dharma [that] is beyond 
question,” as he blends Śiva’s “raw and edgy energy with 
an adamantine yogic calm and a Vaisnavized emotional 
flux. He is, as his devotees often remark with satisfaction, 
the embodiment of both śakti and bhakti…” (Lutgendorf 
2001: 288). The negotiation of opposing poles of religiosity 
displayed throughout this scholarship—powerful śakti with 
devotional bhakti, and a traditional rural hinterland with 
devotees’ modern urban lives—reflects the tenuousness of 
contemporary middle class Hindu South Asia, as its citizens 
continually negotiate issues of inclusion and exclusion.
The inclusion typically inherent in this middle-class 
Hinduism tends to be filtered, regardless of the deity 
central to any particular practice, through a process of 
Vaishnavization. Meant to assist in the upward mobility of 
a community, this devotion to a form or characteristic of 
Vishnu serves several related functions. On the one hand, 
it emphasizes an orderly social process, seen in Vishnu’s 
periodic rescue of the world from chaos in the form of one 
of his avatars. It also uses the broad concepts of dharma and 
bhakti to negotiate classical and contemporary forms of 
social organization. Further, it promotes a devotion to “re-
spectable” patterns of social behavior, including vegetari-
anism (Hawley 2001: 220). Though Gyanendra’s billboards 
eschew both the more politically conservative components 
of Vaishnavization in India (e.g. Hindutvā and Rām rājya in 
the wake of the destruction of the Babri Masjid in Ayod-
hya) and the popular conception of the Nepali king as a 
form of Vishnu, his focus on bhakti, karma, and dharma par-
ticipates in the broader Vaishnavization process described 
by these authors. The functions of this Hindu rhetoric are 
similar to those of the theistic identifications that Steph-
anie Tawa Lama notes in her study of political repre-
sentations of the Goddess in India. In order to legitimize 
people’s participation in political movements, she argues, 
politicians: 1. recast an ongoing struggle in familiar terms, 
2. draw on the emotional appeal of voters and citizens, 3. 
translate a political endeavor into a religious mission, and 
4. simplify the fight as one of good against evil (Lama 2001: 
7-8). Despite the absence of any rhetoric proclaiming the 
king’s popular identity as Vishnu during the first (1990) or 
second (2006) jan andolan, these four related functions were 
clearly operative in Gyanendra’s billboards.
In the sign that stands as the epigraph to this section, “All 
those who love the motherland should commit as one to 
making patriotism (deśbhakti) our meeting point,” Gyanen-
dra utilizes the Hindu devotional term bhakti for explicitly 
political purposes. The compound word deśbhakti rep-
resents the standard Nepali word for ‘patriotism’ that had 
been enshrined in the 1962 Constitution: “Devotion to the 
Nation and loyalty to the State are the fundamental duties 
of every citizen” (Part 3.9.1). The significance of the De-
partment of Information’s use of this word within the larg-
er context of the billboards goes beyond simple patriotism, 
however. Appearing on multiple billboards, the term bhakti 
represents one of the standard and most flexible mode 
of middle class religiosity in contemporary South Asia.11 
Moreover, bhakti is often connected to a specifically Vaish-
nava vocabulary that, as Burghart argues, Nepali royalty 
had long used “in translating the values and ideals of the 
modern nation-state into the Nepali political arena as well 
as in defining the legitimate and illegitimate commitment 
of Nepalese citizens to their state” (1984: 120).
In service of his project of nation building, Gyanendra 
employed a version of Mahendra’s deśbhakti from the nine-
teen sixties, thus recalling the latter’s official references 
to ‘devotion.’ Applying “service to one’s redeeming deity” 
to deś sevā (service to the nation), Mahendra, Richard 
Burghart argues, had further encouraged deś banāune (na-
tion building), deś nirmāṇa (nation construction), and deś 
vikās (national development). Along these lines, Gyanendra 
featured a phrase attributed to Mahendra in one of his oth-
er billboards as he used his father’s deś-centered language: 
“The goal of democracy is not simply democracy. Rather, 
its goal is the construction of the nation (deś nirmāṇa) 
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and of its people” (Burghart 1984: 120). In response to the 
Western concept of equality, Burghart argues, Mahen-
dra further employed the devotional concept of identity 
(samān), thus identifying the citizens of Nepal as devotees 
of Vishnu who possess “an identical subtle substance that 
unites them within the subtle body of Vishnu in the form 
of Parbrahma” (Burghart 1984: 120).
Despite the absence of any such overt Vaishnavism in Gya-
nendra’s rhetoric—he included no language that explicitly 
connected himself or his citizens to the god Vishnu—his 
message still picks up on both the intimacy and inclusion 
often involved in bhakti rhetoric. The ‘love’ (māyā) in the 
board’s opening phrase recalls, for example, the emotional 
longing for Krishna of which the sixteenth century sant 
poet Mīrabāī sang in her devotional poetry (Lorenzen 2004: 
207). The ‘unity’ (aikyabaddha) in the latter part is a repre-
sentative component of avarṇadharmī bhakti, a devotion-
alism that “actively opposed the traditional Hindu social 
and religious ideology of the caste system and patriarchal 
dominance;” practitioners of this form of bhakti often uti-
lize techniques of interior mysticism that “[imply] that all 
human beings are equally grounded in divine reality, [and] 
it is often associated with a more egalitarian social ideolo-
gy” (Lorenzen 2004: 203, 209). The “orderly social process” 
that Hawley identifies as one of the characteristics of 
Vaishnavism takes form here as a stable and permanent 
inclusion that, though sidestepping Mahendra’s “devotion-
al concept of identity” (samān) contributes to a collective 
devotion to the nation. This idealized stability stands in 
opposition to the real instability of both urban middle 
classness in Kathmandu and the opposition that these bill-
boards created between the imagined community of “those 
who love the motherland” and the Maoist rebels, a dichot-
omy that permeates this entire set of royal messages. 
A second sign reinforces this sense of religious affect 
doubling as democratic responsibility: “Exerting great 
effort, do good work. Action (karma) is superior to inaction 
(akarma)” (Figure 2).13 The concept of karma, one of the 
most fundamental among Indic religions, is “the ‘doctrine’ 
or ‘law’ that ties actions to results and creates a determi-
nant link between an individual’s status in this life and his 
or her fate in future lives” (Tull 2004: 309). In the closest 
example of “theistic identification” in all of these boards, 
it is Bhagavān Śrī Kṛṣna, the Hindu deity Krishna, and not 
Gyanendra or any other past Nepali king, who occupies 
the lower-right corner of the sign where the author of the 
message is identified. Its message, a Nepali translation of a 
passage from the Bhagavad Gītā (3.8a) represents a key mo-
ment in the text when Krishna encourages his compatriot, 
the warrior Arjuna, to perform his proper duty, his dharma. 
The context of this billboard, a decade-long civil war with 
the Maoist rebels, reflects that of the Gītā, a lecture given 
by Krishna in the midst of a civil war in which Arjuna does 
not wish to fight against his friends, relatives, and teachers 
but whose doubts are repeatedly assailed by Krishna’s own 
recourse to the terminology of bhakti, karma, and dharma. 
Figure 2. “Exerting great effort, 
do good work. Action (karma) is 
superior to inaction (akarma).”
(Michael Baltutis, 2006)
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This metaphor of battle was not lost, I presume, on the 
Department of Information as they worked to unite Nepal’s 
people against the Maoists and sought to support a janavād 
rather than a janayuddh.
The Sanskrit verbal root (kṛ) upon which the Indic word 
karma (‘action’) is based reinforces the active role of Kath-
mandu’s citizens in yet other boards. One sign, attributed 
to no particular author, reads: “Direct or indirect support 
to terrorists is a punishable crime. Rather than enduring 
terrorism, we should oppose the doctrine of terrorism, 
and we should provide assistance to those who offer 
protection.”14 Though never directly named in these signs, 
Maoist rebels appear here in the guise of the ātaṇkakārī, 
‘terrorists.’ The dichotomy between Kathmandu’s citizens 
and the Maoist rebels that is implied throughout these 
billboards is made explicit here, with this verbal root 
providing the suffix for the two opposing sides: citizens 
should provide assistance not to the ātaṇkakārī (‘those who 
perform acts of violence’) but rather to the surakṣākarmī 
(‘those who offer protection’), the latter referring to the 
police and army, the agents of state power. Moreover, this 
sign’s reference to ātaṇkavād, the ‘doctrine of terrorism,’ 
further dichotomizes the peaceful actions of Kathmandu’s 
citizens, grounded in the ‘people’s doctrine’ of janavād, to 
the destructive actions of the Maoist rebels. Krishna’s ref-
erence to karma in the Gītā reflects not simply the spiritual 
conflict that takes place on the “battlefield of dharma,” 
as the Gītā’s opening verse states, but also to the action of 
engaging in a difficult struggle or even a military conflict. 
More than simply working to win the battle, however, 
Arjuna’s karma, like that of the citizens of Kathmandu, will 
restore the world to its proper cosmic order, echoing the 
Vaishnavization process mentioned above. 
A third sign, attributed to King Mahendra, uses the con-
cept of dharma to speak to the responsibility that citizens 
of Nepal have towards their democratizing nation: “As the 
country belongs to all, our dharma is to carry out our obli-
gations [towards it]” (Figure 3).15 The concept of dharma—
variously translated as law, order, or duty—is, like karma, 
one of the most fundamental and flexible concepts among 
South Asian religions, and it is this issue that Krishna and 
Arjuna negotiate as they debate the proper action (karma) 
that Arjuna is to perform on the battlefield. Hindu dharma 
texts from the turn of the Common Era prescribe dharma 
in myriad ways, dealing with everything from the proper 
activities of a renouncer, to the proper methods of domes-
tic worship, to the proper roles of women. In other words, 
dharma is an open signifier that may be filled with virtually 
any type of proper conduct. Despite this flexibility, Barbara 
Holdrege reminds us of its real-world applications: “In its 
normative dimension, dharma, the cosmic ordering prin-
ciple, finds expression on the human plane in the ritual, 
Figure 3. “As the country belongs to all, 
our dharma is to carry out our obligations 
[towards it].” 
(Michael Baltutis, 2006)
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social, and moral orders…” (Holdrege 2006: 214). In this 
case, we might easily add ‘political’ to Holdrege’s list to 
categorize the responsibility that the Nepali government is 
encouraging in its citizens, as it uses dharma to translate “a 
political endeavor into a religious mission” (Lama 2001: 8).
In summary, the use of bhakti, karma, and dharma con-
tributed to, frequently overlapped with, and reinforced 
the more prosaic and political conceptions of nationality, 
democracy, and livelihood in contemporary Nepal. Such 
messages simplified the fight as one between the urban 
middle class of Kathmandu and the Maoist rebels, thereby 
reproducing values that are part and parcel of the new Ne-
pal (human rights, development, integration into a modern 
globalized world, etc.). The messages did this even as the 
Hindu language inscribed on these boards reinforced the 
Shah dynasty’s long history of religiously and ethnically 
exclusionary policies and the “Hindu and Constitutional 
Monarchical Kingdom” enshrined in the 1990 Constitution.
Though referring to a middle class sense of responsibility 
and though using concrete and recognizable religious lan-
guage, these billboards did not communicate any specific 
activity that citizens were enjoined to perform. Rather, 
they stopped short at merely redirecting the impetus 
behind traditional devotional performances—temple 
worship, neighborhood processions, and communal sing-
ing—towards political actions performed by the nation’s 
bhaktas, those patriots who are unified in their shared 
attitudes and practices towards the process of constructing 
the new Nepal. But, the absence of the theological identity 
between the Nepali king and Vishnu undercut the possibil-
ity of a religio-political identity between king and citizen, as 
Burghart had argued had been the case in King Mahendra’s 
time. This ambiguity of political identity highlighted the 
absence of any detailed directive for citizen activity and 
thus rendered these billboards mere political slogans; the 
responsibility for performing political karma—facilitating 
development, upholding human rights, and responding to 
terrorism—then became, especially within the context of 
Gyanendra’s restrictions on civic freedoms, the duty of the 
royal government. What remained of the dharma of Nepal’s 
citizens was simply a sense of (deś)bhakti, of devotion (to 
the nation), though the inability to know and actively per-
form one’s duty created the opportunity not just for the 
active participation in a new Nepal but also for the active 
rejection of these billboards, of Gyanendra’s February First 
project, and of the Nepali monarchy itself.
Rejecting the Billboards, Building a New Nepal 
“All Nepali people must decide in their own minds 
on their roles and responsibilities towards their 
nation.”
pratyek nepālīle āphno man mastiṣkmā rāṣtrīyapra-
ti āphno pani kehī dāyitva ra kartavya cha bhanne 
bhāvnā rākhnu pardcha |
Billboard on Kathmandu’s Kantipath Road
– attributed to Śrī 5 Gyānendra
A news article on the deteriorating political situation in 
Nepal following 1 February 2005, published by the hu-
manitarian news service IRIN Asia, asserted that Amnesty 
International and other human rights organizations were 
encouraging sanctions against the Nepali government in 
order to encourage the resumption of democratic free-
doms. The photo at the top of this article depicts one of 
the few English language billboards installed in the city: 
“Only a meaningful multyparty [sic] democracy can be an 
effective means of governance by the people.” IRIN’s cap-
tion conveys the general response with which these boards 
were met: “Many have grown skeptical over promises by 
the king, such as this one posted on a billboard outside 
the royal palace in Kathmandu” (IRIN 2006). A photo in 
the English language weekly Nepali Times from April 2006 
shows a billboard that has been mangled and pulled half-
way off of its steel foundations; its caption reads: “REJECT-
ED SLOGANS: Billboards with famous soundbites of King 
Gyanendra after they were toppled by demonstrators on 
Tuesday at Ratna Park” (Sharma 2006). Nearly one month 
after the photo of the mangled sign was published amidst 
widespread graffiti, vandalism, and destruction of many 
other signs, and fifteen months after their installation, the 
royal government removed all 149 billboards. Department 
of Information official Kedar Bhattarai stated, “We have 
decided to remove all hoarding boards carrying the king’s 
quotations considering people’s vehement dissatisfaction 
against the king during the recent democratic uprising” 
(AFP). Another unnamed official stated that the signs “gave 
a false impression that the king was committed to democ-
racy while running the country, despite arresting opposi-
tion leaders and cracking down on the media” (AFP 2006). 
Rather than potentially providing immunity from such 
acts of destruction, I argue that the overtly religious lan-
guage in fact contributed to—and almost demanded—their 
rejection. This rejection was premised on the presumed 
traditional and Hindu notions of exclusion reinforced 
therein and their stark contrast to the theme of inclusion 
widely associated with the building of a new Nepal. The of-
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ficial removal of these boards thus represented not simply 
“dissatisfaction against the king” but a more comprehen-
sive rejection of the idea that the leader of a “Hindu and 
Constitutional Monarchical Kingdom” possesses the ability 
to competently develop the qualities—especially that of 
inclusion—required for the desired new Nepal.16
By way of conclusion, I consider three other examples of 
state-sponsored spaces, voices, and images from contem-
porary Nepal. These examples further contextualize Gya-
nendra’s billboards by presenting similar communicative 
and performative techniques, deployed from the top down 
and in moments of political crisis, that similarly demanded 
the response of Nepal’s citizens. 
In her book Reigning the River, Anne Rademacher focuses 
on the royal government’s construction of a new (and rap-
idly built) urban park in the neighborhood of Maitighar. 
This park was built in anticipation of a 2001 visit from an 
international delegation from the South Asian Association 
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) that just happened to be 
taking place in the wake of that year’s emergency, declared 
following the royal massacre and increasing tensions with 
Maoist rebels. Interestingly, Rademacher notes that large 
public billboards were installed welcoming the SAARC del-
egates, covering up extant advertising billboards. These of-
ficial boards, whose messages became the object of literary 
satire, “blended almost eerily with their ubiquity … [and] 
were ultimately the domain of the state” (Rademacher 
2011: 205). Equally, the “domain of the state” was the focal 
point of Rademacher’s analysis, a stone and iron mandala 
placed as the centerpiece of the Maitighar Park. Reading 
this object as “a restatement of the centrality of Kath-
mandu, the national capital and the seat of a still-reign-
ing monarch, in a larger Nepal gripped by revolutionary 
violence,” Rademacher argues that the mandala was “an 
iconic symbol of the relationship between the monarch 
and the national project [that] transformed Maitighar 
into a spatial rendering of nationhood at a time when the 
kingship was under undeniable strain” (Rademacher 2011: 
122, 123). Though not destroyed outright, the Maitighar 
mandala provided a similar focus of public protest, as did 
the billboards at the core of my analysis, erected some five 
years later. Though difficult to access to by foot, the park 
served as host to hundreds of groups protesting the royal 
government and rallying in favor of a “democratic, new 
Nepal” (Rademacher 2011: 135). 
In her work on the language used on FM radio programs 
in Nepal, Laura Kunreuther contrasts sīdhā with ghumāune 
kurā—the “direct voice” of the personal conversations on 
FM radio with the “talk that goes around” in more official 
media outlets. Kunreuther asserts that listeners and callers 
to these programs are able to use this direct (sīdhā) voice 
as a means not only to give voice to personal and cultural 
issues they may feel to be too difficult to discuss at home 
but also to provide “a means of effecting social change,” 
as this direct speech is “semantically linked to symbols 
of a new democratic moment, particularly transparency 
of governance and ‘free speech’” (Kunreuther 2010: 341, 
344). The end product of this discursive process—brought 
about by this directness and by the social change and 
democracy preliminarily effected—is the development of 
the neoliberal self, Kunreuther asserts, “one in which the 
voice and interiority figures centrally as the critical means 
to reform oneself and society more broadly” (Kunreuther 
2010: 342, 346). State-run Radio Nepal is the polar opposite 
of these FM radio programs and has long been a primary 
source of ghumāune kurā. Kunreuther repeatedly returns to 
this counter example, noting that the typically male voice 
of the Radio Nepal announcer is “regulated” and “mono-
tone,” its cadence lacks spontaneity and connecting phatic 
language, and its use of Sanskritic phrases “evokes an im-
age of highcaste civil servants whose words echo with the 
sound of the state” and whose words “do not mean what 
they say” (Kunreuther 2010: 336-345).17 
Finally, Gérard Toffin’s study of ritual power in modern 
Nepal shows more clearly how the religious content of the 
billboards at the heart of my study was part of their un-
doing. Toffin argues that “royal images and ceremonies…
can be seen as a constructed performance displaying signs 
of authority and delivering a visual message” (Toffin 2008: 
146). He sets this assertion against the backdrop of the 
iconoclastic period (2003-2007) that overlapped with the 
second jan andolan. During this period, dozens of statues 
of Nepali kings were vandalized, demolished, or blown up, 
without attention to the identity of the king depicted or of 
his role in working towards constructing a more demo-
cratic Nepal (Toffin 2008: 171). Each statue was taken to 
be a representation of the royal family, and the removal 
of each and every statue, “the destruction of the old order 
and its symbols,” was required for “making a new Nepal” 
(Toffin 2008: 172). Though Toffin asserts that the organi-
zation of this royal iconoclasm was largely Maoist-led, the 
activity and the logic behind it was much more universal. 
The annexation of the Newar territory of the Kathmandu 
Valley in the eighteenth century by Gorkha armies and the 
forcible Hinduization of Tibeto-Burmese-speaking ethnic 
minorities by more recent Shah kings served as the impe-
tus behind these destructive acts (Toffin 2008: 171). Thus, 
rather than identifying individuals or groups responsible 
for the destruction of these royal icons or, in my case, of 
the state-sponsored billboards, it is this “impetus” within 
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the “iconoclastic period” that encouraged the myriad ex-
amples of vandalism and that resulted in “the destruction 
of the old order and its symbols.” 
The targets of this iconoclasm are, more generally, those 
edicts and objects that represent specifically Hindu forms 
of exclusion that have been enacted through official 
strategies of royal power. Examples of such strategies 
of Hinduization include the construction of myths and 
legends about royal families in Sanskrit Vaṁśāvalī texts, 
the publication of the caste-based Muluki Ain (National Law 
Codes) in 1854, the drafting of multiple Nepali constitu-
tions that assert the nation’s Hindu identity, and regular 
public ritual performances of collective allegiance to a king 
who maintains associations to the Hindu gods Indra and 
Vishnu. Much of the scholarship on such public displays 
by the Nepali state has focused on its conservative func-
tion. Subho Basu asserts, “The quasi-feudal monarchical 
regime used religion to establish its hegemonic ideological 
presence in the political landscape” (Basu 2010: 112), and 
other scholars have written of these displays as elements 
of official propaganda that “propagate,” “promote,” 
“create,” “legitimize,” “foster,” and “enable” the state.18 
I am considering Gyanendra’s billboards here in a less 
functional manner, as a means by which the royal Nepali 
government, at a time of considerable stress, attempted to 
publicly reconceive the nature of the monarchy and of the 
relationship of the state with its people and with the wider 
world, while using a recognizable religious rhetoric and a 
popular form of media, the billboard, to do so.
The value that these boards possessed was not, I argue, in 
their ability to “gather spontaneous consent of the subject 
population to his rule” as Basu asserts (2010: 111). Rather 
than somehow duping Nepal’s citizens into reaffirming a 
long-lost faith in the royal government, their potential val-
ue was rather in their framing as religious narrative. Had 
the signs achieved their intended effect, they would have 
done so by using the universal Hindu language of karma, 
dharma, and bhakti. Such language would construct a new 
Nepal more compatible with a continuation of the royal 
government: a Hindu polity with a mythological dharmic 
past as well as a modern nation state comprised of devoted 
and active citizens, with both ruled by a benevolent and 
democratic monarchy. The hope was that such mutuality 
of form and content could allow the royal government 
to discursively display to the urbanizing residents of the 
Kathmandu Valley the social, political, economic, and reli-
gious values to which they had already been exposed and 
with which they had already begun to negotiate. In doing 
so, the creators of these billboards aspired to align the 
monarchy with this new democratic and capitalist spirit 
glossed in a transhistorical Hindu vocabulary.
Unfortunately for the royal government, the Hindu 
religiosity enshrined in these billboards carried with it 
the exclusivity that typified the ‘old Nepal.’ The form and 
content of the boards too closely resembled the regulated 
and monotone language associated with other forms of 
official discourse whose words were perceived to not mean 
what they say: the Maitighar park that was the “domain 
of the state,” Radio Nepal that carries the “sound of the 
state,” and the vandalized royal images that displayed the 
“old order and its symbols.” Though the presence of these 
billboards—representing a fifteen-month snapshot in the 
history of Nepal when the downfall of the Shah dynasty 
was nearly inevitable—was meant to ground the ideal-
ized attitudes and responsibilities of the citizens in King 
Gyanendra’s vision of the new Nepal, the ensuing icono-
clasm directed against them represented a rejection of this 
same vision: though appearing to be built upon the values 
of “democracy, freedom, individual achievement, and 
responsibility,” the rejected Hindu and subtly Vaishnava 
religious idiom upon which this vision was built served as 
a visual reminder, rather, of the continuity between king, 
country, and religion that was part and parcel of the ‘old 
Nepal’ enshrined in previous constitutions and implied 
throughout this entire set of royal billboards.
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Endnotes
1. Though this term became used much more frequently 
in the wake of the end of the Nepali monarchy, it had been 
used since at least 2003 (cf. Acharya 2003).
2. It is to this long-running criticism that Gyanendra 
appears to respond in one of his billboards: “Local culture 
is to be recognized as the civilizing elements and as 
the treasures of any nation’s incalculable wealth” (Lok 
saṁskṛti nai kunai pani rāṣtrako bahumūlya sampattikā 
sāthai sabhyatā ra sampannatāko pahicān ho).
3. See Sijapati 2013 for the ways that Muslims in 
Kathmandu negotiated their identities within a Hindu 
kingdom.
4.  The use of formal Nepali is evident even in the first 
sign listed above, as the Sanskritized “nava Nepāl” is used 
instead of the more colloquial “nayā Nepāl.”
5. The Nepali ‘Śrī 5’ [shrī pāṇch] has no direct English 
language equivalent, but refers to the ‘fifth-level 
glorification’ that was originally bestowed upon the Shah 
kings during the Rana period (1846–1951). The “Sva.” that 
precedes the name of King Birendra refers to his status as 
svargavāsī, “residing in heaven.” 
6. See Burghart 2001 and Malagodi 2013 (89-93, 94-97) on 
the public use of religious rhetoric by King Mahendra.
7. One dictionary defines this term as: “a political 
principle in which the supreme administrator must be 
elected by common people” (Krämer 2007: 60). 
8. Another board, quoting King Tribhuvan, reads: 
“In democracy, citizens possess a great responsibility 
prajātantra mā nāgarik ko ṭhulo dāyitva huncha |.
9. Personal communication, Dina Bangdel and Ramesh 
Parajuli. 
10. nepālī rājmukuṭ prajāko nimti, nepālī prajā rājmukuṭ 
ko nimitta, rājā ra prajā dubai nepāl ra nepālīko nimti.
11. Another billboard read: “In the interest of patriotism 
(deśbhakti) and in the interest of the welfare of the nation 
and its people, all conflicts should be put to rest, and all 
solutions based on mutual ill-feeling must be eliminated” 
(pratyek vivādlāī deśbhaktiko ādhārmā suljhāī apsī 
manomālinyalāī deś ra janatāko hitko ādhārmā ṭuṅgyāune 
pardcha).
12. prajātantra prajātantra ko nimitta nabhaī janatāko ra 
deś nirmā ko nimti ho. 
13. prayatnaśīla bhaera khub kām gara, akarma bhandā 
ta karma nai śreṣṭha huncha |. The Sanskrit of the Gītā 
(3.8a) reads: niyatam kuru karma tvam karma jyāyo hy 
akarmana.
14. ātaṅkakārīlāī pratyakṣa vā apratyakṣa sayahog garnu 
daṇḍanīya aparādh ho | ātaṅk sahanu bhandā āta 
ṅkabādko birodh garauṁ, surakṣākarmīlāī sahayog 
garauṁ | .
15. deś sabaiko sājā ho, kartavyamā lāgnu nai hāmro 
dharma ho.  
16.  The Constitution of 1990 stated that “Nepal is a 
multiethnic, multilingual, democratic, independent, 
indivisible, sovereign, Hindu and Constitutional 
Monarchical Kingdom,” but the Interim Constitution of 
2007 eliminated all references to religion, asserting, “Nepal 
is an independent, indivisible, sovereign, secular, inclusive 
and a fully democratic State” (Article 1.4.1).
17.  John Whelpton similarly asserts the 
counterproductivity of the formal language of Radio 
Nepal broadcasts, where “many villagers cannot have 
fully understood what was being said, while for more 
sophisticated listeners the propagandist nature of the 
broadcasts was so obvious as to be frequently counter-
productive” (Whelpton 2005: 170). 
18.  Ostrowski 2006: 14; Hangen 2007: 11-12; Basu 2010: 
111.                      
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